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that any jurisdictional question can be reopened tnrless based solely
on a litigated question of fact.
Although the federal rule is quite restrictive on a litigant's
ability to question a jurisdictional determination, it seems that
the appellate division has unnecessarily gone to the other extreme.
A more moderate rule is the Restatement rule: "When a court
has jurisdiction over the parties and determines that it has
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties cannot collaterally
attack the judgment .. . unless the policy underlying the doctrine
of res judicata is outweighed by the policy against permitting
the court to act beyond its jurisdiction." 15 This principle
would permit review of the -jurisdictional basis where the court
was one of limited jurisdiction or where the lack of jurisdiction
seemed obvious,' 46 without opening the courts to collateral attacks
on every judgment except the few based solely on issues of
fact.
Collateral Estoppel: Glaser v. Huette followed.
In Glaser v. Huette,' 47 the Court of Appeals held, that where
parties to a former suit were not adversaries, but rather cofendants, an adjudication in that suit settles nothing with respect
to the liability of the co-defendants inter se in subsequent actions.
Subsequent to Glaser, the technical requirements necessary to
interpose collateral estoppel defensively were liberalized by the
Court of Appeals. 14s More recently, the Court of Appeals has
allowed the offensive use of collateral estoppel and some doubt
has been thrown upon the continuing validity of the Glaser rule
49
by Cummings v. Dresher.1
However, cases involving joint tortfeasors have continued to apply the Glaser rule.
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This principle was

adopted in Peri v. Groves, 183 Misc. 579, 50 N.Y.S.2d 300 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1944).
'14 Other pertinent factors indicated by the Restatement include: whether
the issue was one of law or of fact; whether the issue of jurisdiction was
actually litigated; and whether there is a strong policy against the court's
exceeding its jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 10(2) (1942).
147 256 N.Y. 686, 177 N.E. 193, aff'g, 232 App. Div. 119, 249 N.Y.S. 374

(1st Dep't 1931). A number'of lower court rumblings have held contra.
See Thornton, Further Commeit on Collateral Estoppel, 28 BiooxLvN L.
REv. 250 (1962); The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 42 ST.
JOHN's L. Rav. 128, 152 (1967).
'8 Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 X.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 151 N.Y.S2d
9
1 (1956).
149 18 N.Y.2d 105, 218 N.E.2d 688, 271' N.Y.S2d 976 (1966).
For a
further discussion of this case, see The Quarterly Survey of New York

Practice, 42 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 128, 153 (1967).
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In light of this liberal trend, the appellate division, second
department, recently decided Bartolone v. Niagara Car & Truck
Rentals, Inc.50° Plaintiff was the owner and operator of a car
involved in a collision with an automobile owned by a corporate
defendant and operated by an individual defendant. Personal
injury actions, brought by passengers in plaintiff's car, against
plaintiff and defendants resulted in judgments against the three
defendants. Plaintiff thereupon brought an action against the
owner and operator of the other vehicle. Defendants contended
that they should be permitted to plead res judicata, since the
issues of negligence and contributory negligence were determined
in the other actions. In a memorandum opinion, the court held
that Glaser v. Huette "is presently the law of New York and
we apply it to this case."
Collateral Estoppel:

Court of Claims interprets DeWitt
requirements.

In Alberto v. State,"'2 the court of claims was afforded the
opportunity to interpret the requirements for the use of collateral
estoppel, as posited by B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall,"'3 and
Cummings v. Dresher.154 Claimant had been involved in an
accident near the Tappan Zee Bridge, where his car skidded
into an automobile operated by one Siccardi. Siccardi, and the
passengers in his car, brought a personal injury action against
claimant in federal court. There claimant sought to prove that
the State had been negligent by maintaining the road in a
dangerous condition. However, his offer of proof was rejected
on the ground that the State was not a party to the action, and
could not, therefore, defend itself. The jury found claimant
negligent and returned a verdict for the plaintiffs.
In the instant action, the State moved to dismiss claimant's
assertion of negligence under CPLR 3211(a) (5) on the ground
that the findings in the federal court were res judicata as to the
issues presented.
In rejecting the State's contention, the court reasoned that
DeWitt limited the application of collateral estoppel to cases in
which a party has had the opportunity to present all evidence
available in order to exonerate himself. It was said that
15029 App. Div. 2d 689, 288 N.Y.S.2d 312 (2d Dep't 1968).

1

Id. at 690, 288 N.Y.S2d at 313.

15256 Misc. 2d 235, 289 N.Y.S.2d 14 (Ct. C1. 1968),
20319

N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).

For a

further discussion of DeWitt, see The Quarterly Survey of New York
Practice, 42 ST. JoHrN's L. REv. 128, 150 (1967).
154 18 N.Y2d 105, 218 N.E2d 688, 271 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1966).

